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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF REASONABLE
COMPENSATION IN THE CLOSE
CORPORATION
Edward M. Alvarez*
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a
taxpayer may deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses including "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered."' The code
provision permitting a deduction for reasonable salaries or other
compensation for personal services has formed a part of the taxing statutes since 1916.2 Although there has been some dispute
as to the legislative purpose of Section 162,8 it seems clear that
the Section was intended to permit a limitation on the compensation of employees who are also stockholders to only that compensation which is reasonable in light of the circumstances.4 Since
1916, litigation has been so plentiful that statistical summaries
have been prepared analyzing decided cases in an attempt to assist
tax planners in evaluating a specific factual situation.5 These
summaries include no less than 500 reported cases.
The great majority of the cases in this field involve close
corporations. 6 In most cases the employees whose salaries are in
* B.S., University of Santa Clara, 1960; J. D., University of Santa Clara School
of Law, 1965; Member, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, California Society of Certified Public Accountants, and American Bar Association Committee on Taxation; Member, California, United States Tax Court, and United States
Court of Appeals-Ninth Circuit Bars; Author, How Treasury's New Proposed Rules
on Integrating Retirement Plans Will Work, JOURNAL OF TAXATION, November, 1968;
Lecturer, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a)(1), as amended.
2 Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 214(a)(1), 234(a)(1).
3 59 HAR. L. REV. 286 (1945).
4 See Revenue Act of 1916, Reg. 33 (revised), Art. 138, which provides:

"Salaries of officers or employees who are stockholders will be subject to careful
analysis, and if they are found to be out of proportion to the volume of business
transacted, or excessive when compared with the salaries of like officers or employees
of other corporations doing a similar kind or volume of business, the amount so paid
in excess of reasonable compensation for the services will not be deductible from
gross income, but will be treated as a distribution of profits."
5 DIXON, PLANNING REASONABLE COMPENSATION, 19 N.Y.U. TAX INSTITUTE 181

(1961); MEYER, REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION-A TABULAR REvIEw, 26 N.Y.U.
TAX INSTITUTE 1121 (1968); HALSEY & PELOUBET, FEDERAL TAXATION AND UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION (1964); 3 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA TAX CooRDi-

NATOR, APPENDIX H (1970); 1 CCH FED. TAX RPTe. § 1372 (1970).
6 A close corporation is defined for purposes of this article as a
corporation
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question are also shareholders of the corporation or members of
a family controlling the corporation. Until recently, the typical
reasonable compensation case could be characterized as involving
a basic factual inquiry as to whether or not the questioned salary
was unreasonably high when measured against the judicial standards developed over the years." This article is not intended to be
a review of the decided cases or a review of all of the facets of
reasonable compensation decisions.' Its purpose is to examine
recent cases in order to demonstrate that previously developed
judicial criteria for deciding the "reasonableness" of compensation in corporations may no longer be germane to the resolution
of such cases.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The problem at hand can be simply stated. Although a corporation is entitled to deduct a reasonable amount for compensation paid
for personal services, in any close corporation the amount of the
deduction will come under close scrutiny in an effort to determine
whether or not the amount paid is purely for personal services or is
in reality a distribution of corporate earnings otherwise taxable as
a dividend. To the extent that earnings can be distributed by a corporation to its shareholders without incurring a corporate tax on
those earnings, an overall tax benefit will result. Since corporate
earnings are taxed at 48 per cent above $25,000 of taxable income,0
each dollar paid to a shareholder-employee which is deductible as
compensation will usually result in an over-all tax savings of $.48.
The only alternative available for distributions of earnings to a
shareholder is a dividend which is not deductible by the corporation.1" Thus, it is apparent that the question of reasonableness of
compensation is inseparably related to the question of whether or
not all or a portion of the purported compensation payment is in
reality a disguised dividend.
A reasonable compensation case usually involves two basic issues. First is the question of whether the payment was in fact made
for services actually rendered." The problem here is determining
the intent of the parties. Was the distribution of compensation intended to be a distribution of earnings and not the purchase price
which has relatively few shareholders. See ONEAL, CLosE CORPORATONS, VOL. 1, § 1.62
(1958).
7 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 25.61-25.87 (1970).

8 202 TM., Reasonable Compensation (1968).
9 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 11.
10 See generally INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 316.
11 TREAS. REo., § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1970).
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for services? Second is the question of whether the amount of the
payment is reasonable in light of the services performed. Here the
nature of the inquiry involves the placing of a value upon services
admittedly rendered. In this connection, "reasonable compensation"
has been defined as "such amount as would ordinarily be paid for
like services by like enterprises under like circumstances."' 2 Accordingly, "unreasonable" compensation has been defined as "salaries in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services."' 3
Regardless of which of the two issues is predominant in a given
fact situation, some 'general principles can be applied to all reasonable compensation cases. The most basic of these principles is that
the taxpayer has the burden of proof and he must produce evidence
which at a minimum will overcome the presumption of correctness
in favor of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service that
the Commissioner's determination is correct. 4 If the taxpayer produces such evidence then the Commissioner must come forward
with evidence supporting his position. 5 How well the taxpayer
meets his burden will usually determine how much of the claimed
compensation deduction will be allowed. Where the taxpayer fails
to meet this burden, then the Commissioner's determination will be
accepted." Significantly, there appear to be no cases in which the
court has made a completely independent determination, that is,
allowed a compensation deduction either above that claimed by the
taxpayer or below that proposed by the Commissioner.
The second general principle applicable is that the question of
reasonableness of compensation is a factual one and each case must
be decided upon its own facts." It is only by analyzing the particular business circumstances and the specific employment relationship
that the court can determine the proper amount of deductible compensation.
Finally, there is an apparent presumption that in any closely
held corporation there will be an absence of arms-length bargaining.
Not only is the salary paid to an owner of a close corporation subject to close scrutiny, but so too is it assumed that it is impossible
for an arms-length compensatory arrangement to be entered into
between such owner and his controlled corporation. 8 Thus in each
Id., § 1.162-7(b)(3).
Id., § 1.162-7(b)(1); see also Weise-Winkler Bindery, Inc., 26 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1336 (1967).
14 Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
15 Roth Office Equipment Co. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1949).
16 Craigs Drug Store, Inc., 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 1104 (1969).
17 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
1 See Harolds Club v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1965).
12

13
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case where the taxpayer is either a shareholder or a member of a
shareholder's family, no weight will be accorded the argument that
the compensation was established by contract or negotiated bargaining. This rule has been applied where the compensation was
fixed by resolution of the corporation's Board of Directors, 9 where
the compensation was established under a contingent contract; 20 and
where the compensation was established long before the services
were actually rendered. 2 '
Was the Payment for Services Actually Rendered
Many cases referred to as reasonable compensation cases do
not really involve the question of the reasonableness of the amount of
compensation at all. In fact, they involve situations in which a payment is made to a shareholder-"employee" and is merely labelled
as compensation. Thus, it is required that the personal services
either have been rendered in the past or are to be rendered in the
future.22 An exception to this rule was recently recognized in a case
involving a consulting contract.28 In Hatt,24 it was held that it was
sufficient that one make his services available even though no services were in fact ever rendered. Here too, the question of reasonableness would be relevant. The services involved must be rendered
to the employer or on behalf of the employer and not to some other
person.2 5 Also, the payment must be to the person who rendered the
services, and not, for example, to his designee. 6 An exception exists,
however, where the benefits are paid to the widow or other family
27
member of a deceased employee.
Where no services at all are rendered, the payment may constitute a payment for property, 28 or it may be a gift,29 or the payment
may constitute a dividend.8" However, there is an inherent danger
in claiming a deduction under these circumstances. For example, in
Alicia Ruth, Inc., 1 the court held that the taxpayer not only has
19 E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 10 T.C. 102 (1948).
20 Harolds Club v. Commissioner, supra note 18.

21 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 17.
22 Sparks Nugget, Inc., § 70.074 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (on appeal, 5th Cir.).
28 Herbert G. Hatt, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1194 (1969).
24 Id.
25 George Haiss Mfg. Co., 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1106 (1957). See also Miles
Production Co., 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1387 (1969).
26 Fort Orange Paper Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 917 (1960).
27 TREAs. REG. § 1.404(a)-12 (1970).
28 Lewis & Taylor, Inc.,'28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1969).
29 Raymond A. Biggs, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1177, 1189 (1968).
30 Paul E. Watson, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1409 (1960).
31 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 262 (1969). See also Nathaniel A. Denman, 48 T.C.
439 (1967); Mulder Bros. Inc., 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1967), where issue of
fraud was raised.
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the burden of showing that services were actually rendered and that
the value of the services was equivalent to the amount claimed, but
that he also has the burden of demonstrating that no negligence was
involved in making the claimed deductions. In Ruth payments were
made to a 50 per cent shareholder but no evidence was produced to
demonstrate that he had performed services. Accordingly, a 5 per
cent negligence penalty was imposed in addition to the assessed deficiencies.
Reasonableness of the Amount
Once the initial determination has been made that the payment
was, in fact, in exchange for services, then the court must decide
whether or not the amount of compensation in question represents
a reasonable allowance for such services. In making this factual determination, the courts have been guided over the years by a great
number of different factors. In the "traditional" compensation case,
these factors are carefully evaluated and weighted in light of the
particular facts of the case. The factors have been stated to be:
.. the employee's qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the
employee's work; the size and complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income;
the prevailing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries
with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns; the salary
policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of small
corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compen32
sation paid to the particular employee in previous years.

It is important to note that in the cases referred to, the princihle
issue is only that of the value to be placed on the services. The
question to be explored hereafter of whether the payment involved
was intended to be a distribution of profits taxable as a dividend is
usually not relevant in this type of case.
An example of the "traditional" reasonable compensation case
is to be found in Hammond Lead Products, Inc."3 The Hammond
case affords an excellent example of the serious difficulties which the
trier of fact encounters in attempting to place a value on the services of employees who admittedly have contributed heavily to the
success of a closely held business. In Hammond, a father and son
for many years operated a successful business. Each had a salary
arrangement dating back many years, consisting of a base salary,
a percentage of the net income of the corporation and additional
incentive compensation. The additional incentive compensation for
82

Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 17, at 119.

88 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 54 (1969), aff'd 425 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1970).
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the son consisted of $1.00 for each ton of production. In the case of
the father, the incentive compensation consisted of $1.00 for each
ton of sales. The court found that although the form of the compensatory arrangement was common in the industry and was evidenced by a written contract entered into before the services were
performed, the contract was not controlling since it had been entered into between the corporation and its shareholders. Accordingly,
since the contract was not the result of arms-length bargaining, a
determination could still be made as to the reasonableness of the
compensation. 4 The court then went on to decide the case on the
basis that although both men functioned jointly as the chief executive team for the corporation, the principle factor to be considered
was the nature and extent of the services and the qualifications of
the employees and their contributions to the success of the business.
Here the court made a specific finding that the father's role in running the business was less active and less important than the son's
role and, therefore, the son's compensation was found to be reasonable in amount, while a substantial portion of the father's compensation was disallowed as being unreasonable.
Thus, in Hammond, the emphasis was not on whether the payment was a distribution of earnings taxable as a dividend. In fact,
the company involved paid substantial dividends. Hammond makes
it clear that the determination under Section 162 (a) (1) is to be
made independent of any determination of the nature of the disallowed portion of the payment. Whether or not the disallowed payment constitutes a dividend under local law or tax law should not
be relevant. The sole issue as to reasonableness of the amount, consequently, should be the proper "value" to be placed on the services.
DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCY

Contrasted with Hammond are a number of recent cases which
serve to demonstrate that the government and the courts appear to
be evaluating the various factors which traditionally have resulted
in the determination of the reasonableness of the amount of the
compensation solely in the context of whether or not the payment
involved is in reality a distribution of profits-and thus, equivalent
to a dividend. A study of these cases will reflect the judicial criteria
being developed to guide the courts in deciding the question of
whether all or a portion of the payment a shareholder-employee received was the equivalent of a dividend and taxable as such.
This determination of whether the payment is equivalent to a
84

Id. at 62. See also Harolds Club v. Commissioner, supra, note 18.
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dividend typically involves a twofold approach in which the court
will first discuss those factors which tend to influence its decision
as to the value to be placed on the services and, thus, the reasonableness of the amount. These are the subjective, Hammond-type
factors, the most common of which are: (1) the degree to which the
particular employee has contributed or contributes to the success
financially of the corporation-his particular qualifications; (2)
the extent and scope of his actual duties, how much time he expends
in the business and how much responsibility he bears; and (3) the
comparability of his compensation to compensation of others in
similar situations.
Having given some degree of attention to these subjective factors the court will thereafter focus on certain factors which are
purely financial in scope. Here, the following factors are significant:
(1) the manner in which the payment is made, whether contractual
or not; (2) the ratio of compensation to other business financial
standards such as gross sales, gross profit or taxable income; and
(3) the company's past dividend history. A review of recent cases
will illustrate the use of the above factors by the courts and will
serve to demonstrate that little weight is now being accorded the
subjective factors so that the cases are now being decided solely on
the basis of the financial factors-an approach which results in clear
and unwarranted discrimination against the close corporation.
In Craigs Drugstore, Inc., 5 the salary in question was that of
a majority shareholder operating an average size retail drugstore.
The particular salary arrangement was such that the employee received a basic salary and a bonus. The bonus was determined pursuant to a contract under which 90 per cent of the corporate profits
were divided between the three employee-shareholders of the corporation. The allocation of the contract compensation among the
employees was determined by the court to be in the ratio of their
stockholdings. The court reviewed the evidence regarding the qualifications of the particular employee and summarized its viewpoint
on the value of the services by stating:
[Alithough hard work is indeed a traditional manifestation of the
American way of life, it is not-even in our affluent society-an open
ended justification of any and all payments for such work as reasonable compensation for tax purposes.36

The court, though admitting that the employee involved was
the principal executive officer of the corporation, concluded that his
tasks were clerical in nature and accorded little weight to the tax85 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1104 (1969).
36 Id. at 1106.
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payer's contribution to the success of the business. No evidence was
submitted regarding comparable salaries. The court then decided
the case on the basis of the financial factors: The amount of profits
being distributed as compensation was unusually large; the manner
in which the compensation was determined appeared to make it a
mechanism for the distribution of profits; and the corporation had
paid no dividends. The court thus agreed with the Commissioner
that the employee's salary should be allowed only to the extent of
$36,000 as opposed to the $48,000 claimed."
In a very recent case,8" the Tax Court has made it clear that
the financial factors will outweigh the subjective factors even where
the most favorable of findings are made regarding the qualifications
8 9 the company had been
of the employee. In Barton-Gillet,
for
many years involved in the printing business, but due principally
to the extremely competitive nature of the industry, was enjoying
little success. In 1955, its operations resulted in a loss. In that year,
Mr. Barton, the son of one of the company's founders was employed
as president. From 1955 to 1960, a great deal of his efforts were
directed at developing the company's business in a specialty printing
area. Admittedly, he was singularly responsible for increasing the
company's business in specialty printing areas from $500,000 to
$1.4 million during the years 1961 through 1966. At the same time,
the company's normal business was decreasing from $350,000 to
$200,000. The court summarized its feelings on the issue of Barton's
worth to the business by stating:
...Barton is demonstrably a man of unusual talents. On his own he
developed an approach which could be used with great success by
eleemosynary institutions in improving their images and in explaining
their purposes and goals to the general public. Through his personal
efforts he developed the necessary contracts with the policy makers
of various eleemosynary institutions. He possessed the salesmanship
ability to induce said institutions to try this new approach. Finally,
he oversaw the work done on behalf of each
client. The work itself
40
required a great deal of creative thinking.

Thus, the court clearly admitted that Mr. Barton possessed all
three of the characteristics of the ideal corporate executive. He was
able to develop an idea, sell it and manage its overall application.
One might conclude that on this basis there would be little to
distinguish Mr. Barton from the Chairman of the Board of General
Motors Corporation whose reported annual salary approximates
37
88

89
40

Id. See also Boyle Fuel Co., 53 T.C. 162 (1970).
The Barton-Gillet Co., 70 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1970) (on appeal).
Id. at 759.

Id.
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However, the court did make a distinction which must

necessarily rest solely on the fact that Mr. Barton owned 100
per cent of the outstanding stock of Barton-Gillet Co. It therefore
concluded that:
We would of course agree that a controlling shareholder executive is
entitled to be paid as a comparable executive of a publicly owned
corporation. But this is not to say, where the controlling shareholder
sets his own compensation as an executive, that the reasonableness of
such compensation does not require a second
look by reason of the
42
obvious lack of arm's length bargaining.

With this in mind, the court then discussed the relevant financial
factors. The taxpayer pointed out that the majority of Barton's
compensation was determined pursuant to an incentive type of
contract common in the industry, and thus ostensibly established
that had Mr. Barton been employed by a public company he would
have received an identical amount of compensation. The court
dismissed this argument on the basis that "we are not impressed
with the argument that a sole shareholder can pay himself incentive
compenation. 43 In so stating, the Tax Court apparently adopted
the reasoning of the Court of Claims to the effect that a contract
which is reasonable with a nonshareholder may be unreasonable
if made with a shareholder." There appears to be no basis for such
a distinction in the Code.
The court next noted that the ratio of Mr. Barton's total compensation to the gross profit and net income of the corporation
appeared to be high. However, the court's own ultimate determination resulted in ratios strikingly close to the original ratios:

1964
1965
1966

Compensation
Deducted

Compensation
Proposed
by IRS

Compensation
Allowed by
Court

$ 96,000
100,000
127,000

$ 60,000
60,000
75,000

$ 80,000
83,000
108,000

It would appear that the case was decided solely on the basis of the
third financial factor considered by the court-the failure of the
company to pay any dividends with respect to its common stock.
Here, the court stated its position as follows:
41

167.

Main, An Expanding Executive Pay Package, 77

FORTUNE,

June 15, 1968, at

42 Barton-Gillet Co., supra note 38, at 758. See also Miles-Conley Co. v. C.I.R.,
173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949).
43 Id. at 759.
44 Irby Construction Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Northlich, Stolley, Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 435 (1966), aff'd 368 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl.
1966); accord, City Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1956).
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While Barton was entitled to be well rewarded, a degree of commensurate recognition should also be given to the contributors of capital.
Obviously, in a service-type corporation like the petitioner such contribution does not deserve the recognition that it should receive in a
manufacturing corporation, but that is no reason to justify its being
45

totally ignored.

It is submitted that the Tax Court in actuality concluded in
Barton-Gillet that Mr. Barton's compensation was reasonable but
that a certain portion of it was necessarily a distribution of profits
in the nature of a dividend. There is no support for this position in
either the Code or the Regulations. It is significant, however, to
note that had the Tax Court chosen to specifically find Mr. Barton's
compensation to be reasonable but nevertheless to allocate a certain portion of it as a distribution of profits in the nature of a
dividend, it could have found support in a line of Court of Claims
decisions.4 6
In Charles M. McCandlesS47 the Court of Claims made a

specific finding that the compensation involved was reasonable in
amount-not only did the employee receiving the payment contribute greatly to the success of the business but his compensation
was actually lower than that paid to similar executives in the same
industry in accordance with the government's evidence. However,
noting that the corporation had never paid a dividend the Court
stated:
That any return on equity capital is so conspicuous by its absence as
to indicate ... that the purported compensation payments necessarily
48
contained a distribution of corporate earnings within.

The Court of Claims then held that a return of equity capital
of 15 per cent of net profits before salaries would be reasonable and
justified. This is the first and only case which totally ignores the
issue of reasonable compensation but determines the amount of a
"reasonable dividend" allocable as part of the intended compensation
distribution. One could conclude that the Tax Court in Barton-Gillet
arrived at the same conclusion, but was reluctant to identify, as a
dividend, the amount allocated to excess compensation. In its
determination, the Court of Claims cites as the sole authority for
its position the case of Klamath Medical Service Bureau.49 It would
45 The Barton-Gillet Co., supra note 38, at 760 (emphasis added).
46 Charles McCandless Tire Service v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. CL

1970).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1339, 1340.
49 29 T.C. 339 (1957),

966 (1959).

aff'd 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 359 U.S.

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. I11

not appear that the Klamath case can support either the decision
in McCandless or in Barton-Gillet.
In Klamath, a group of doctors were rendering services on
behalf of their medical service corporation. Under their arrangement
with the corporation the doctor-shareholders received, as compensation for their services, amounts in excess of 100 per cent of their
individual billings. The government contended that the entire
amount received was in reality a distribution of earnings to stockholders or, in the alternative, if the payments were held to constitute compensation for services rendered, that the entire amount
was not deductible because it was unreasonable compensation. This
appears to be the first case in which the issue was so presented to
the Tax Court. The court recognized that the primary question was
whether or not the payments were compensation for services. In
this connection it made a specific finding that both the intent of
the taxpayer and the manner in which the payments were made indicated that only a certain portion of payments were actually made
for services. Accordingly, the court made a specific finding that only
a portion of the payments constituted reasonable compensation, and
the balance of the payments constituted a distribution of the profits
of the taxpayer to be taxed as a dividend. It is clear that in Klamath
neither the government nor the court maintained that had the entire
amount of payments been held to be reasonable a certain portion
would have been disallowed as being dividend distributions. The Tax
Court, in fact, indicated that had the entire amounts actually been
intended to be compensation, a finding could have been made that
the payments were reasonable up to the amounts actually paid. 50
On appeal, 5 ' the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
Tax Court. The Appellate Court, however, further confused the
issue involved by noting that the employment agreement entered
into between the taxpayer and its employees obligated it only to pay
a fixed amount as compensation (this was the amount allowed by the
Tax Court as reasonable compensation). It concluded, therefore,
that any additional amounts were purely voluntary payments. Thus,
it held that the deduction for these additional amounts would fail
on the general test found in Section 162: That the expense to be
deductible must be both ordinary and necessary. The Ninth Circuit's
point, of course, completely avoided the question that had been put
to the Circuit Court by the taxpayer-if the payments are found
to be reasonable in amount then the deduction must be allowed in
full. It is reasonable to conclude that in both opinions the decision
50 Id. at 350.
51 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1959).
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was based upon a finding that the taxpayer neither intended to pay
nor paid, the amounts in dispute for services rendered. The principal
proof of this latter fact was that the contract entered into with the
employees involved did not provide for such additional payments.
On this basis, the decision of the Tax Court appears to be sound.
Soon after the decision in Klamath the Court of Claims cited
the case as standing for the proposition that:
Even a payment that is reasonable is not deductible if it was actually
of earnings as contrasted with compensation for services
a distribution
52
rendered.

It is clear Klamath did not hold that reasonable compensation
payments could be disallowed as being distributions of earnings in
a close corporation. Where the taxpayer intends the payments to be
compensatory and actually pays them in a manner consistent with
the employment arrangement there can be no basis in Section
162 (a) (1) for a contrary holding. Accordingly, it is submitted that
the decision and the reasoning of the Court of Claims in McCandless
is erroneous.5 3
A recent District Court case 54 seems to approach the problem
from yet another vantage point. In Modern Woodworking,55 the
court stated that where the efforts of the officers of the corporation
did not produce any significant net income for the corporation, it
could be unreasonable to pay them salaries "which didn't produce
anything."5 6 The court in a jury trial noted that in determining
what is reasonable compensation, the nature and amount of the
services rendered as compared with the amount of capital investment must be taken into account and a determination made as to
how much of the income of the corporation was due to the exercise
of personal services and how much was due to the investment of
capital. This reasoning appears to introduce the concept that
reasonable compensation can be determined only with reference
to the net income of the business involved, and would lead to the
conclusion that in a business in which there is a capital investment, no matter how small, some portion of the corporation's profits must be allocated to this capital investment and only the balance
can be made available for distribution as compensation. It is subIrby Construction Co. v. United States, supra note 44, at 827.
No appeal is pending in McCandless. It should be noted, however, that an
appeal from a decision of the Court of Claims lies only to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
54 Modern Woodworking, Inc. v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9256 (D.
52

53

Colo. 1968), aff'd, - F.2d 55 Id.
56 Id. at 84, 143.

(10th Cir. 1970).
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mitted that this approach to the problem may be sound as compared
to the McCandless approach. Here the emphasis is solely on valuing
the services. In order to place a proper value on the services to the
business purchasing such services, one may necessarily have to
consider the position of invested capital. However, this is not to
say that all distributions of compensation will necessarily contain
a dividend where no dividends have otherwise been paid. In fact
the holding in Modern Woodworking was that the compensation
payments were reasonable.
The "Reasonable Dividend" Approach
On the basis of the above cases, a new law of reasonable compensation appears to be developing based upon the premise that an
owner of a close corporation must consider, in determining a reasonable allowance for compensation, a reasonable return on the capital
investment in the corporation. The basis for such a position seems
sound if kept in the context of the problem of valuing the services
involved. If, however, this line of reasoning is extended so that
compensation otherwise reasonable is found to be unreasonable to
the extent necessary to allocate a certain portion of the corporate
profits to the capital investment, then such a position is unreasonable. There is no support for such a position in the Code and it
is obviously discriminatory since it applies only to close corporations.
A publicly held corporation may operate at a loss and yet pay its
employees whatever salaries are deemed reasonable under the circumstances. Further, there is no merit to the concept that a distribution to an owner-employee must necessarily contain a distribution
of profits. Corporations are not required to distribute their profits
in the form of dividends and, in fact, many publicly held corporations never distribute dividends at all. Additionally, the Congress
has separately provided for the problem of unreasonable accumulations of income in the close corporation."
UnreasonablyLow Compensation
A new dimension has been added to the law of reasonable
compensation as a result of two recent cases involving small business
corporations electing to be taxed under Subchapter S.5" In Roob5 9
and Krahenbuhl, ° the Tax Court held that the salaries in question
were too low. The issue was not whether a deduction should be
allowed under Section 162, but whether the compensation was
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-535.
58 Id. § 1375(a)(3).
59 Water J. Roob, 50 T.C. 891 (1968).
0 Pat Krahenbuhl, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 55 (1968).
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reasonable in light of the services performed. In both these cases,
the Tax Court determined that the shareholder-employees should
have paid themselves more compensation. In making this determination the court applied those factors typically applied in the
traditional reasonable compensation case. Obviously, the taxpayer did not raise the issue that the compensation of its shareholderemployees was too low, the issue was raised by the Commissioner.
Since the income of a Subchapter S corporation is taxed entirely and
directly to its shareholders 1 a common tax planning technique involves the transfer of stock to the owner's children for the purpose
of shifting the incident of taxation to the children. Here the effect
of the increase in salary was to reshift income back from the children
to the parents. It is clear that all family corporation compensation
arrangements will be scrutinized in an attempt to eliminate possible
artificial shifts of income among family members. However, based
upon the results to date under Section 162, the Commissioner may
be making a poor choice of weapons in an effort to combat abuses.
The basic principle involved here is an important one and in need
of further resolution-to what extent can a shareholder-employee
of a close corporation contribute his services to the corporation?
The Roob and Krahenbuhl cases do not focus clearly on this issue.
It is submitted that unless the issue is faced squarely, another endless stream of litigation will result, all under the guise of "reasonable compensation."
ProfessionalCorporations
A great deal of discussion is presently taking place with respect
to the proper guidelines for establishing compensation in a pure
service corporation such as a professional corporation. Since the
advent of the professional corporation laws, a large number of
doctors, dentists, lawyers and other professional persons have incorporated professional practices. In many instances, the net income
of these practices is extremely high. This immediately raises the
problem of the proper allowance for compensation. Take for example, the case of the corporation with a net income of $100,000,
all attributable to the services of a given professional person. In
deciding the proper amount of compensation for the professional
employee there must be taken into account the corporation's ability
to avail itself of the benefits of qualified retirement plans.6 2 In a
qualified retirement plan, up to 25 per cent of compensation may
reasonably be paid to a qualified trust under a retirement program
61 See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§
62 See generally, Id. §§ 401-404.

1371-1377.
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established by the corporation for the benefits of its employees. 68
Using the 25 per cent as a basis for contributions to the qualified
plan, the professsional man could receive an $80,000 cash salary
from this corporation and $20,000 in deferred compensation in the
form of a retirement plan contribution. It is well settled that the
term "compensation" as used in Section 162, includes both nondeferred and deferred compensation and that contributions to
retirement plans are a form of deferred compensation.64 Thus, for
purposes of determining whether or not the compensation allowance
is reasonable, the entire $100,000 would be taken into account.
There are only two cases which directly discuss the issue of
the proper amount of compensation which may be paid to the
professional man."5 The holding in McClung Hospital,Inc.,"8 appears
to provide some sound guidelines for planning. In that case, the
McClung family, all doctors, were operating a hospital. Two of the
McClungs performed full-time and substantial services while the
elder McClung, the father, was much less active. The Commissioner
took the position that compensation equal to 100 per cent of the
aggregate fees billed was apparently unreasonable since all other
doctors employed by the hospital were paid a lesser proportion of
patient fees after reduction for various overhead expenses and uncollectible accounts. The court followed the reasoning in Klamath
Medical Service Bureau and held that compensation for the two
active McClungs was not unreasonable simply because it represented
100 per cent of fees billed without reduction for any other overhead
expenses. In light of the services performed their compensation was
held to be reasonable. However, in the case of the elder McClung,
the court found that he did not perform any substantial services
and that, therefore, his compensation could not be computed using
as a basis the aggregate fees billed by all three family members. Accordingly, the court allowed only a small portion of the father's
actual compensation as a deduction. McClung seemingly stands for
the proposition that where a professional person is performing substantial services, 100 per cent of his fees billed (without reduction
for overhead) might constitute reasonable compensation.
It is clear, however, that the theories involved in cases such
as Barton-Gillet, McCandless and Modern Woodworking would
readily apply to the professional corporation. As a result very
63 The statutory limits under Section 404 permit greater contributions under
certain circumstances, but 25 per cent is the maximum allowed where the corporation
has adopted both a profit-sharing and a pension plan. Id. § 404(a)(7).
64 TREAs. REG. § 1.404 (1970); The Barton-Gillet Co., supra note 38, at 759.
65 Klamath Medical Service Bureau, supra note 49; McClung Hospital, Inc., 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 449 (1960).

68 Id.
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serious consideration should be given to the role of invested capital,
however small, in the distribution of profits.
Reimbursement Agreements
The effect of an adjustment to a compensation deduction is
solely related to the payment of the deficiency arising on account of
the disallowance. Since the amount involved has been paid out no
adjustment need be reflected upon the books other than a reclassification from salary to dividend. Frequently, consideration will be
given to the idea that the disallowed compensation should be repaid
to the corporation by the person receiving such compensation. If
the person making the payment were to receive a deduction in the
year of the payment, his personal tax position might be substantially
the same as it would have been had he not reported the income
originally. From the corporation's viewpoint, it will receive the
necesssary funds with which to make the deficiency payment.
Obviously, a shareholder in the 48 per cent tax bracket in both the
year of receiving the payment and the year of repayment will still
be out-of-pocket a net of 52 per cent of the amount he originally
received. The corporation, if taxed at the 48 per cent tax bracket,
will find its surplus increased by 52 per cent of the amount received
from the employee. These economic results should be considered
carefully before entering into such arrangements with the corporation. In many closely held corporations the payment of additional
taxes may serve to reduce surplus in a manner which may assist in
alleviating the danger of the corporation being subjected to the tax
on unreasonable accumulations. Further, the shareholder involved
may no longer have the funds with which to make a repayment.
Where the decision is made to provide for repayment, careful con67
sideration should be given to the three decided cases and to Revenue Ruling 69-115.68

In each of the decided cases, the issue was whether the taxpayer would be entitled to an ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction 69 for an expenditure directly connected with or
pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business. The general rule that
has developed is that the portion of the amounts repaid to the corporation which represent excessive salary and which is made under
a legal obligation to make such repayment is deductible under
Section 162. It would appear that only where the repayment agreement is entered into prior to the payment of the salaries in question
67 Vincent E. Oswald, 49 T.C. 645 (1968); George L. Blanton, 46 T.C. 527
(1966) ; Ernest H. Berger, 37 T.C. 1026 (1962).
68 Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 50.
69 TRnAs. REG. § 1.162-1 (1970).
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would such an agreement constitute an enforceable obligation under
applicable State law. Thus, where the repayment agreement is
entered into after the salary is paid out but before the disallowance
is proposed, the amount repaid would not be deductible.70 This
repayment agreement may be evidenced in the bylaws of the corporation.71
SUMMARY

Over the years Section 162(a)(1) has been the subject of a
steady stream of litigation. It should be clear from the foregoing
discussion that recent cases have added new judicial constructions
to the Section and consequently new dimensions to future litigation.
The courts appear to be developing an attitude towards the close
corporation which would effectively prohibit such corporations from
setting compensation for its shareholder-employees in accordance
with common business practices. It is one thing to say that a salary
is unreasonable because the employee did not earn it. It is quite
another thing to say that it is unreasonable simply because the
employee is also a stockholder. Yet in a recent case the Fifth
Circuit stated that:
The supervisory services that the president performed are the kind
that might be expected of a major shareholder who would look to
dividends rather than salary for his compensation.72

The inference from the foregoing statement is clear. Unless a
change is made in this thinking the veil of the closely held corporation will be judicially pierced, a result neither intended nor warranted
under the statute.
70 Blanton, supra note 67.

71 Oswald, supra note 67.
72 Branlette Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. 200 (1969).

F.2d -

(Sth Cir. 1970), aff'd 52

